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RECENT CASE NOTES
to paying a license tax and to posting a bond as was required by an Illinois
statute. The United States Supreme Court said, "The sole question presented
is the constitutional validity of the act as it affects the appellant's liability
under its bonds. The statute is a police regulation. The business regulated
is local, having its situs within the state and being conducted therein. The
fact that the commission merchant contracts to sell, and sells, farm produce
forwarded to him from points without, as well as from points within, the state
is not enough to condemn the regulation of business carried on within her
borders. Such effect as the regulation has upon interstate commerce is indirect
and incidental and does not trespass upon the power conferred on Congress
by Article I, Section 8, of the Federal Constitution."1 5 Obviously, the Supreme
Court believes that in some instances the requirement of a license and the
posting of a bond only indirectly and incidentally affects interstate commerce.
It is submitted that this case indicates that the proper rationalization for
upholding the ordinance involved in the instant case, is that it operated as an
indirect regulation of interstate commerce under the state's police power.1 6
S. H.
STATUTES--TITLE-SERVICE OF PROCESS ON NON-RESIDENT MOTORLSrs.-Action
by appellee against appellant to recover damages occasioned by an automobile
collision. Appellant is a nonresident of the State of Indiana and service of
process was had upon the treasurer of state (secretary of state) under the
provision of chapter 179, sec. 15, Acts 1931. By special appearance appellant
moved to set aside the service and quash the return indorsed on the summons
on the ground that he was not a resident of Indiana and was not personally
served with summons. Appellant appeals from judgment for appellee, con-
tending the provision of chapter 179, sec. 15, Acts of 1931, to be unconstitu-
tional as in violation of sec. 19, article 4 of the Indiana Constitution which
provides, "Every act shall embrace but one subject and matters properly con-
nected therewith; which subject shall be expressed in the title. But if any
subject shall be embraced in an act, which shall not be expressed in the title,
such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be expressed in
the title." The title to the act in question is "An act concerning the financial
responsibility of owners and operators of motor vehicles for damages caused
by the operation of motor vehicles on public highways." Held, the provision
authorizing service of process upon the treasurer of state as agent for a
nonresident operator of motor vehicles is within the title of the act announc-
ing that the act has to do with the financial responsibility of owners and
operators of motor vehicles for damages caused by the operation of motor
vehicles on the public highways.1
The interpretation of the Constitutional limitation upon legislative action,
that the title to an act shall express the subject of the act and that every act
shall have but one subject, is well settled in the United States and Indiana.
The great weight of authority holds such constitutional provisions to be satis-
15 Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. People of State of Ill. (1936),
56 S. Ct. 685.
16See Gavit, The Commerce Clause (1932), p. 40; Haines, Federal Re-
straints on the States' Power to Regulate House to House Selling (1934), 6
Rocky Mountain Law Rev. 85.
1 Herman v. Dransfield (1936), 200 N. E. 612.
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fled if the title states in general terms the subject, or object, of the act, and do
not require the title to disclose the details of the legislation, or furnish an
abstract, synopsis, or index of the contents of the act; to require such would
unreasonably hamper legislation, and would necessitate the setting forth of
the entire act in the title thereto. The courts declare that a reasonable itner-
pretation should be given and consider the requirement met if the title fairly
indicates the subject of the enactment so as to put interested persons upon
inquiry as to the exact scope of the indicated subject of the enactment. 2
Although there has been but little litigation on this phase of the validity
of statutes providing for substituted service of process on non-resident mo-
torists,3 the few cases involving it have been determined according to the
predominant, reasonable, and liberal interpretation of the title requiremtnts.A
Indiana, by the holding in the principal case, has fallen in line in the applica-
tion of the general rules of construction to this particular type of statute. As
stated by the court, "Viewed in the light of these well-settled rules (concerning
title of statutory enactments) the title under consideration seems to be devoid
of difficulty. The title announces that the act has to do with the financial
responsibility of owners and operators of motor vehicles for damages caused
by the operation of motor vehicles on the public highways. A reading of the
act discloses the means and method of making the financial responsibility for
such damages effective. Section 15 provides the means of serving process on
a non-resident in such cases. Service of process is germane to and properly
connected with the subject of financial responsibility of owners and operators
of motor vehicles for damages caused by the operation of motor vehicles on
public highways." 5 Since the principal case is the first reportedO case in
2 General authority 99 A. L. R. 124; 8 R. C. L. Perm. Supp. s. 100; State
ex rel. Cohran v. Lewis (1935), - Fla. -, 159 So. 792; Domenech v. Porto
Rican Tobacco Co. (1931), 50 F (2d) 579 (Porto Rico); Commonwealth v.
Kentucky Jockey Club (1931), 238 Ky. 739, 38 S. W (2d) 987, State v. Ward
(1931), - Mo. -, 40 S. W (2d) 1074, Massie v. Court of Com. Pl. (1931),
- N. J. -, 156 A. 377, Dolese Bros. v. Board Comrs. (1931), - Okla. -,
2 P (2d) 955, Brooks v. State (1931), - Okla. -, 3 P (2d) 814, Orlosky
v. Haskell (1931), 304 Pa. 57, 155 A. 112. Indiana authority- Indiana Central
Ry. v. Potts (1856), 7 Ind. 681, Hingle v. State (1865), 24 Ind. 28, Mull
v. Indianapolis and C. Traction Co. (1907), 169 Ind. 214, 81 N. E. 657;
State v. Closser (1913), 179 Ind. 280, 99 N. E. 1059; Moore-Mansfield Co. v.
Indianapolis, N. & R. Ry. Co. (1913), 179 Ind. 356, 101 N. E. 296, Crabbs v.
State (1923), 193 Ind. 248, 139 N. E. 180; Sarlis v. State ex rel. Trimble
(1929), 201 Ind. 88, 166 N. E. 270; Gillespie v. State (1857), 9 Ind. 380;
Reed v. State (1859), 12 Ind. 641, Bright v. McCulloch (1866), 27 Ind. 223;
Benson v. Christian (1891), 129 Ind. 535, 29 N. E. 26; Lewis v. State (1897),
148 Ind. 346, 47 N. E. 675, Chicago & I. R. Co. v. State ex rel. Ketcham
(1899), 153 Ind. 134, 51 N. E. 924, Isenhour v. State (1901), 157 Ind. 517, 67
N. E. 40; State v. Paris (1913), 179 Ind. 446, 101 N. E. 497.
3 The wording of the title of the acts of many states preclude litigation upon
this point because of the impossibility of misinterpretation. The following
representative acts expressly relate to the service of process upon non-resident
motorists: Fla., Laws 1931, p. 509; Iowa, 44 G. A. 90; La., Acts 1932, p. 576;
Ohio, Acts 1933, p. 36; Ore., Laws 1929, p. 3; Mass., Acts 1928 ch. 344, N. J.,
Laws 1924, p. 517, Mich., Comp. Laws 1929, sec. 4790.
499 A. L. R. 124; State ex rel. Cohran v. Lewis (1935), - Fla. -, 159
So. 792.
5 Herman v. Dransfield (1936), 200 N. E. 613 (Ind.).
g There have been some trial court decisions on tus point but the principal
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Indiana involving the validity of this type of statute, it is well to note briefly
the constitutional history and the scope of such.
Statutes providing for service of process in automobile accidents upon some
state official as agent for a non-resident owner or operator of a motor vehicle
have consistently been held to be constitutional with respect to the due process
clause of the Federal Constitution. 7  Such statutes have been held to confer
jurisdiction upon the courts over the person of the non-resident defendant on
the ground of consent impliedly given to serve him through the agency of th
state official. 8 However, the validity of the statute has consistently been held
to depend upon the reasonableness of the notice afforded the non-resident de-
fendant.0 It has been upon this phase of the problem, rather than upon the
title requirements, that most of the litigation has arisen. The power of the
state to provide for the acquisition of jurisdiction in this manner has been
unanimously sustained under its power to regulate its highways and the
use thereof.1O
Although it is undeniable that there is a great social interest in the protec-
tion of individuals from the hazards of modern traffic, there is also a great
social interest in individual freedom and economic security. These interests
are brought to the front in the event of service of process on non-resident
motorists through the agency of a state official. The plaintiff may not have a
worthy cause of action and the defendant may be put to considerable expense
in procuring witnesses and protecting his interests. This difficulty has been
met in some states by means of the requirement of a bond by the plaintiff.1l
Other states have made no attempt to meet it.12 A further problem for con-
case is apparently the first reported case involving it. See Burns Ind. Stats.
1933, sec. 47-1015, anno.
7 Culp, Process in Actions Against Non-Resident Motorists (1934), 32
Mich. L. Rev. 325-343, 57 A. L. R. 1230; 35 A. L. R. 951; Berry, Automobiles
(1935), sec. 5.318; Hendrick v. Maryland (1915), 235 U. S. 610, 35 S. Ct.
140; holding that a state could enact reasonable police regulations for all
motorists; Kane v. New Jersey (1916), 242 U. S. 160, 37 S. Ct. 30, holding
that a state could require the appointment of a state official as the agent for
service of process by a non-resident motorist; Hess v. Pawloski (1927), 274
U. S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632, holding such statute which provided for notice to
the non-resident defendant to be within the due process clause; 99 A. L. R.
131; Jones v. Paxton (1928), 27 F. (2d) 364 (Minn.); Dowling, Motor Vehicle
Statutes; Hit and Run; Service of Process on Non-Residents (1931), 17 A. B.
A. J. 798, 814. See also, 82 A. L. R. 768.
8 Gavit, Casebook, Trial and Appellate Procedure (1935), 105.
0 99 A. L. R. 131; Culp, Process in Actions Against Non-Resident Motorists
(1934), 32 Mich. L. Rev. 337; Wuchter v. Pizzutti (1928), 276 U. S. 13, 48
S. Ct. 259; Jones v. Paxton (1928), 27 F (2d) 364 (Minn.); Hirsch v.
Warren (1934), 253 Ky. 62, 68 S. V. (2d) 767; Shushereba v. Ames (1931),
255 N. Y. 490, 175 N. E. 187.
1099 A. L. R. 131, Moore v. Payne (1929), 35 F. (2d) 232 (La.), Morrow
v. Asher (1932), 55 F 2d) 365 (Tex.); Carr v. Tennis (1933), 4 F. Supp.
142 (Pa.) ; Grote v. Rogers (1930), 158 Md. 685, 149 A. 547; Rubin v. Gold-
berg (1931), 9 N. J. Mis. R. 460, 154 A. 535; Culp, Process in Actions Against
Non-Rresident Motorists (1934), 32 Mich. L. Rev. 327; Cohen v. Plu;schak
(1930), 40 F. (2d) 727 (N. J.).
11 Culp, Process in Actions Against Non-Resident Motorists (1934), 32 Mich.
L. Rev. 350; 11. Rev. Stat. (Cahill 1933), c. 95a, see. 21 (1); Me. Rev. Stat.
1930, c. 29, sec. 131; Mich. Comp. Laws 1929, sec. 4791; N. Y. Consol. Laws
(McKinney 1929), bk. 62A, sec. 53.
12Culp, Process in Actions Against Non-Resident Motorists (1934), 3?
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sideration is the hesitancy of the law to give extraterritorial effect to state
statutes. 1 3 Such is in effect done when a non-resident is placed under the
jurisdiction of a state by means of this substituted service. However, this
problem seems to be more of a superficial, than of a substantive nature and
probably will be ironed out by provisions for the protection of the defendant.
As to the extraterritorial effect of state statutes, the trend seems to be to
permit such where private rights are concerned, and rightly so in view of the
facility of modern communication and travel.14 Thus, it appears that social
convenience and social policy support the principles underlying the statutes
permitting service of process on non-resident motorists through the agency of
a state official.
Accepting the conclusion reached by the weight of authority as to the
constitutionality and desirability of such statutes we are confronted with the
question of the scope thereof. To whom do they apply? As a general rule,
it has been held that ownership alone is not a sufficient basis upon which to
hold an automobile owner liable for injury caused by his automobile.1 5
Further, service of process statutes, being in derogation of the common law,
have been strictly construed,16 not only must the plaintiff comply with all
the terms of the statute,1 7 but the statute will not be extended to include by
implication parties who are not expressly within the terms thereof.18 In
fact, in many instances the statute has been perhaps unreasonably limited.' 9
Where the provision is as to the operation of an automobile, the word opera-
tion has been construed to mean the physical, personal act of manipulating
Mich. L. Rev. 350. The author indicates that while there is certainly a
legitimate place for the non-resident motorist statutes, they may allow oppor-
tunity for fraud against non-residents. To prevent such abuse, every statute
should make some provision for the deposit of security by the plaintiff.
13 Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (1927), ch. 1.
14 Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (1927), 16-17; Culp, Process in Actions
Against Non-Resident Motorists (1934), 32 Mich. L. Rev. 325.
15 White v. McCabe (1935), 208 N. C. 301, 180 S. E. 704.
16 Day v. Bush (1932), 18 La. App. 682, 139 So. 42; Brown v. Cleveland
Tractor Co. (1934), 265 Mich. 475, 251 N. W 557, Syracuse Trust Co. v.
Keller (1932), - Del. -, 165 A. 327. These and other cases so holding,
base their strict construction, as a general rule, upon the fact that the statute
is in derogation of the common law. However, it is suggested that this is
a rather insufficient reason since the fact that statutes are needed from time
to time indicates that the common law is by no means perfect. For this reason
-the imperfection of the common law-it would seem that the fact of a statute
being in derogation of the common law might be a valid basis for liberal
rather than strict interpretation.
17 Since this method of securing jurisdiction over the defendant is unusual,
the plaintiff should show full compliance with the requirements of the act.
Schilling v. Odlebak (1929), 177 Minn. 90, 224 N. W 694.
18 Day v. Bush (1932), 18 La. App. 682, 139 So. 42.
19 Culp, Process in Actions Against Non-Resident Motorists (1934), 32
Mich. L. Rev. 345, "Jurisdiction of suits against non-resident motorists is
grounded upon the policy of securing compensation for injuries to local resi-
dents. This policy is equally applicable whether the driving is done by the
owner, or the agent, chauffeur, servant, or a third person with consent. The
potential harm is as great whether the non-resident owner himself or another
be driving his car, and the necessity for resorting to substituted service is
just as pressing." Apparently the author disagrees with the tendency to apply
principles of strict construction to statutes using the word "operate"
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the controls; in other words, the act of driving.20 Under such construction
only a non-resident who was actually driving an automobile at the time of
a collision would come within the statute. A better construction would admit
of an agency relation between the non-resident owner and the actual operator
or driver of the vehicle. 2 ' The latter construction would undoubtedly include
corporations, 2 2 whereas there is some belief that the former does not.2 3
However, the Indiana and many other state statutes obviate this difficulty by
expressly providing for the provision to include the operation of the vehicle
by an agent.2 4
The definition of non-resident-who is a non-resident-has been the sub-
ject of some litigation concerning the statutes under discussion.2 5 Perhaps
the answer is too obvious and in general too well-settled in the law to
warrant much consideration of it here. However, it has been held that a
resident of a foreign country is such a non-resident as to come within such
statutory provision, 2 6 and that a person temporarily within the state for
summer residence is still a non-resident within the meaning of such a statute.2 7
Although authority is not abundant as to the classification of the non-
residents who may be involved under such statutes, or who are generally
within the scope of them, there seem to be three general classes brought
out by the cases so far. These are personal representatives of a deceased
non-resident, infants, and corporations.
As heretofore suggested, statutes of the instant type have been strictly
construed. Few of them have included the personal representativs or assigns
or heirs of a deceased non-resident motorist; consequently the few cases on
the subject hold that such statutes do not include the executor, or administrator
of the non-resident motorist.28 Two additional reasons for not extending the
statute to a non-resident defendant who is deceased are the impossibility of
notice and the revocation of the agency of the state official by the death of the
non-resident. However, it is submitted that the inclusion of the personal rep-
20 Culp, Process in Actions Against Non-Resident Motorists (1934), 32
Mich. L. Rev. 345; O'Tier v. Sell (1930), 252 N. Y. 400, 169 N. E. 624, (Repair
man driving-non-resident owner held not to be within the terms of the
statute), Morrow v. Asher (1932), 55 F. (2d) 365 (Tex.) (servant or
employee).
21 Culp, Process in Actions Against Non-Resident Motorists (1934), 32
Mich. L. Rev. 345; Berry, Automobiles (1935), sec. 5.324; Zurich General Acc.
& Liabil. Ins. Co. v. Brooklyn & Q. Transit Corp. (1930), 137 Misc. 65,
241 N. Y. S. 465.2 2 Bischoff v. Schhepp (1930), 139 Mis. 293, 249 N. Y. S. 49; Zurich Gen.
Acc. & Liabil. Ins. Co. v. Brooklyn & Q. Transit Corp. (1930), 137 Misc. 65,
241 N. Y. S. 465, Berry, Automobiles (1935), see. 5.322, sec. 5.324.
23 34 Harv. L. Rev. 950-951.
24 Acts Ind. Gen. Assembly 1931, ch. 179, sec. 15; Culp, Process in Actions
Against Non-Resident Motorists (1934), 32 Mich. L. Rev. 345, 346, 347.
25 Berry, Automobiles (1935), sec. 5.321.
28 Hand v. Fraser (1931), 139 Misc. 446, 248 N. Y. S. 557.
2 7 Bigham v. Foor (1931), 201 N. C. 14, 158 S. E. 518.
28 Boyd v. Lemmerman (1933), 11 N. J. Misc. 701, 168 A. 47; Lepre v.
Land Title Trust Co. (1932), 11 N. J. Misc. 887, 168 A. 858; State ex rel.
Ledin v. Davison (1934), - Wis. -, 256 N. W. 718; Young v. Potter Title &
Trust Co. (1935), 115 N. J. Law 518, 181 A. 44; Dowling v. Winters (1935),
208 N. C. 521, 181 S. E. 751.
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resentative of the non-resident by express terms of the statute will be sufficient
to bring such persons within the scope thereof. 20
The class, infants, presents a two-fold problem. One aspect is that of the
applicability of the statute to the infant operator himself; the other is that
of the applicability of the statute to the parent owner. It has been held that
the infant is bound by the statute and cannot avoid the agency of the state
official because of his infancy.3 0  It has also been held that the parent
owner, though not within the state at the time of the accident, is subject to
the application of the statute.3 1 There is a divergence of authority on this
latter point, however. Those states having the "Family Car Doctrine" of tort
liability are in accord with the holding that the parent owner is subject to
the statutory substituted service on non-resident owners of automobiles.3 2
Those states denying the doctrine do not consider the parent owner liable
except for his own tort-such as entrusting the car to a known incompetent
member of the family 3 --or upon the grounds of agency.3 4  Thus, in the
former class of states the parent owner might well be held liable, or subject
29 Dowling, Motor Vehicle Statutes; Hit and Run; Service of Process on
Non-Residents (1931), 17 A. B. A. J. 798, 814, indicates that the modern
tendency is to favor plaintiffs in automobile collision cases: Harris v. Nashville
Trust Co. (1914), - Tenn. -, 162 S. W. 584, wherein the court said that the
tendency has been by decision and statute to limit and circumscribe the effect
of the rule that actions abate by death of parties thereto, held that the estate
of a deceased testator was liable for a libel contained in the testator's will:
State ex rel. Leden v. Davison (1934), - Wis. -, 256 N. W 718, though
holding the Wisconsin Statute inapplicable to the executor of the deceased
non-resident, stated, "Had the legislature so intended, (for the executor, ad-
ministrator, or personal representative to be within the statute) it would have
been a simple matter to make manifest such intention * 0 c- The court
then suggested possible statutory language to include this situation, such as
"irrevocable appointment binding on his executor, administrator, or personal
representative", "in actions against him, or his executor, administrator, or
personal representative," or "process against him or his executor, administrator,
or personal representative" The court declined to pass upon the question of
the constitutionality of such a statute, but it seems reasonable to suppose that
such a provision would be constitutional as a reasonable exercise of the police
power of the state.
80 Berry, Automobiles (1935), sec. 5.323; Gesell v. Wells (1930), 229 App.
Div. 11 at p. 14, 240 N. Y. S. 628 at p. 632, "It is not contractual in a strict
sense; it is an obligation imposed by the sovereign power of the state upon
the act of coming into the state and using the state's highway. The obligation
then becomes complete and binding because the statute so declares it. Its
command and obligation cannot be evaded, disaffirmed, or repudiated because
of infancy."
81 Gesell v. Wells (1930), 229 App. Div. 11, 240 N. Y. S. 628; see, Culp,
Process in Actions Against Non-Resident Motorists (1934), 32 Mich. L. Rev.
345-347, for policy behind such statutes; see also, Dowling, Motor Vehicle
Statutes; Hit and Run; Service of Process on Non-Residents (1931), 17 A. B.
A. J. 798, 814.
32See Harper, Law of Torts (1933), sec. 283, for a discussion of the
'Family Auto Doctrine of Tort Liability' and the policy behind such. See
also, Berry, Automobiles (1935), sec. 5.05 on the same subject.
83Repczynoki v. Mikulak (1931), 93 Ind. App. 491, at 495, 157 N. E. 464;
Harper, Law of Torts (1933), sec. 283, Berry, Automobiles (1935), sec. 5.05.
34 Smith v. Weaver (1920), 73 Ind. App. 350, 124 N. E. 503, McGoran v.
Cromwell (1927), 86 Ind. App. 107, 156 N. E. 413, Harper, Law of Torts
(1933), sec. 283; Berry, Automobiles (1935), sec. 5.05.
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to substituted service of process as a non-resident whether or not he had
consented to the use of the car by the infant. In the latter group, the proba-
bility is that the parent owner will come within the terms of the statute only
when he has authorized the infant to take the car, or to operate it, as his
agent.3 5 In view of the present trend towards vicarious liability in such
cases it would seem advisable that the statutes in question be construed in
that light.
The third class is that of corporations. It is obvious that a corporation as
an entity cannot perform a physical act such as operating an automobile, but
can do such only through the medium of human agents. Yet, a corporation
can own an automobile and can direct, in a sense, its operation. Under our
present corporate system of organization, as a result of which perhaps a
majority of the motor vehicles using the highways of the states are corporate-
owned and operated, there can be little doubt that non-resident corporations
should be within the ambit of the statutes providing for service of process
on a state official as agent for non-resident motorists or owners of motor
vehicles. Such seems to be the rule3 6 notwithstanding the strict interpreta-
tion given to those statutes which in their wording pertain only to the opera-
,tion of motor vehicles. 3 7
As stated before, the principal case is the first reported Indiana case
involving the Indiana statute concerning service of process upon a state
official as agent for a non-resident operator or owner of a motor vehicle. The
court has followed the weight of authority in its interpretation of the title.
requirements of the state constitution. It has indicated a liberal attitude
towards this statute, again according with the weight of authoriy and the
modern trend. The wording of the statute, expressly including the situation
wherein the vehicle is operated by one authorized by the owner, has obviated,
to a great extent, the problem of construing the term "operation." The fur-
ther problem of whether or not a non-resident, as well as a resident plaintiff
may avail himself of the statute, may well be decided in accord with the
weight of authority which permits such, 3 8 since the Indiana statute is not
limited to resident plaintiffs. 3 9 As to the question of who is a non-resident
35 Dowling, Motor Vehicle Statutes; Hit and Run; Service of Process on
Non-Residents (1931), 17 A. B. A. J. 798, 814.
36Berry, Automobiles (1935), sec. 5.322; Bischoff v. Schnepp (1930), 139
Misc. 293, 249 N. Y. S. 49; Zurich Gen. Acc. & Liabil. Ins. Co. v. Brooklyn &
Q. Transit Corp. (1930), 137 Misc. 65, 241 N. Y. S. 465, Bessan v. Public
Service Co-ordinated Transport (1929), 135 Misc. 368, 237 N. Y. S. 689; see,
Culp, Process in Actions Against Non-Residents (1934), 32 Mich. L. Rev. 346,
"There is every reason for jurisdiction over non-resident firms and foreign
corporations which exist relative to the non-resident individual and it seems
that jurisdiction over firms and corporations is properly maintained."
3734 Harv. L. Rev. 950-951; Clesas v. Hurley Machine Co. (1931), 52
R. I. 69, 157 A. 426.
38Fine v. Wencke (1933), 117 Conn. 683, 169 A. 58; Beach v. Perdue Co.
(1932), - Del. -, 163 A. 265, Sobeck v. Koellmer (1933), 240 App. Div. 736,
265 N. Y. S. 778; State ex rel. Rush v. Dane County (1932), 209 Wis. 246, 244
N. V 766; Berry, Automobiles (1935), sec. 5.321. However, some statutes,
New Jersey and Tennessee, are by their terms limited in their application to
residents.
39 Burns, Ind. Stat. 1933, sec. 47-1015, Acts 1931, ch. 179, sec. 15.
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within the meaning of the statute and other problems likely to arise in the
future, the principal case indicates that the Indiana courts will base their
decisions upon social policy and the modern trend of decisions. H. P C.
TRUSTS-INVESTMENT OF TRUST FUNDS BY TRuSTEE.-Individual trustee was
directed in the instrument creating the trust to invest $10,000 so as to produce
as much income as was safe and reasonable. The trustee invested the funds
in stocks of a private corporation, without getting the sanction of the court,
and without any statutory permission or provision in the trust instrument
permitting him to do so. At the end of the trust period, the value of the
stocks had depreciated. The lower court found that the trustee was bound
to pay over to the beneficiaries the full value of the original trust fund, plus
simple interest. Held, decisions of lower court affirmed. 1
What constitutes proper investments for trust funds early received the
consideration of the English courts in the case of Ex parte Cathorpe,2 where
it was decided that public securities alone were proper trust investments.
This stringent rule has been relaxed, however, by a series of statutory enact-
ments, so that at the present time funds may be invested in Bank of England
stocks, stocks of canal, railway, and public service corporations, and in first
mortgages on land. 3 This is significant in that it tends to show that the
English trend is to liberalize the rule in regard to depositories of trust funds.
In the United States the general rule is broadly declared to be that the
trustee, in making trust investments, is bound to exercise the care of a rea-
sonably prudent man in making his own investment, "having primarily in
view the preservation of the estate and the amount and regularity of the
income to be derived." 4 In addition to this general rule, the trustee is fur-
ther bound by statutes in almost all of the states prescribing the type of
security in which trust investments are proper.5  Some securities, such as
municipal, state, or Federal bonds,6 and promises to pay secured by a first
I Sellers v. Milford et al. (1935), 198 N. E. 456.
2 1 Cox Eq. Cas. 182 (1785).
3 Trustee Act, (1850) 13 and 14 Vict., -ch. 60; Trustee Act (1852), 15 and
16 Vict., ch. 55, Lord St. Leonard's Act (1859), 22 and 23 Vict., ch. 35; Lord
Cranworth's Act (1860), 23 and 24 Vict., ch. 38, Act (1867), 30 and 31 Vict.,
ch. 132; Trustee Act (1888), 51 and 52 Vict., ch. 59; Trustee Act (1893), 56
and 57 Vict., ch. 53, Trustee Act (1925), 15 Geo. 5th, ch. 19.
4 Restatement of Trusts, sec. 227, p. 645, in which it is stated. "In making in-
vestments of trust funds, the trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary in the
absence of provisions in the terms of the trust or of a statute otherwise provid-
ing, to make such investments, and only such investments, as a prudent man
would make of his own property, having primarily in view the preservation
of the estate and the amount and regularity of the income to be derived."
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